Till Stegerse-mail: *my last name* at cs.ucdavis.eduPGP Key | Stats Short BioI am a PhD student in the Department of Computer Science at the University of California, Davis. From 2001 to 2005, I studied Mathematics with Computer Science at TU Darmstadt in Germany. In 2002/2003, I was fortunate to attend the graduate program in Mathematics at Tulane University in New Orleans. Since joining UC Davis in Fall 2005, I've been having fun working on topics in cryptography and security. My advisor is Phil Rogaway. |
|
|
|
|
PublicationsFormat-Preserving EncryptionMihir Bellare, Thomas Ristenpart, Phillip Rogaway, and Till Stegers Selected Areas in Cryptography 2009 Download PDF of full version Abstract: Format-preserving encryption (FPE) encrypts a plaintext of some specified format into a ciphertext of identical format — for example, encrypting a valid credit-card number into a valid credit-card number. The problem has been known for some time, but it has lacked a fully general and rigorous treatment. We provide one, starting off by formally defining FPE and security goals for it. We investigate the natural approach for achieving FPE on complex domains, the "rank-then-encipher" approach, and explore what it can and cannot do. We describe two flavors of unbalanced Feistel networks that can be used for achieving FPE, and we prove new security results for each. We revisit the cycle-walking approach for enciphering on a non-sparse subset of an encipherable domain, showing that the timing information that may be divulged by cycle walking is not a damaging thing to leak. How to Encipher Messages on a Small Domain: Deterministic Encryption and the Thorp Shuffle Ben Morris, Phillip Rogaway, and Till Stegers Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2009. Download PDF Abstract: We analyze the security of the Thorp shuffle, or, equivalently, a maximally unbalanced Feistel network. Roughly said, the Thorp shuffle on N cards mixes any N1-1/r of them in O(r log N) steps. Correspondingly, making O(r) passes of maximally unbalanced Feistel over an n-bit string ensures CCA-security to 2n(1-1/r) queries. Our results, which employ Markov-chain techniques, enable the construction of a practical and provably-secure blockcipher-based scheme for deterministically enciphering credit card numbers and the like using a conventional blockcipher. Authentication without Elision: Partially Specified Protocols, Associated Data, and Cryptographic Models Described by Code. 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 2009) Phillip Rogaway and Till Stegers Download PDF Abstract: Specification documents for real-world authentication protocols typically mandate some aspects of a protocol's behavior but leave other features optional or undefined. In addition, real-world schemes often include parameter negotiations, authenticate associated data, and support a multiplicity of options. The cryptographic community has routinely elided such matters from our definitions, schemes, and proofs. We propose encompassing them by explicitly modeling the presence of unspecified protocol functionality. To demonstrate, we provide a new treatment for mutual authentication in the public-key setting, doing this in the computational cryptographic tradition. In our model, compactly described in pseudocode, a protocol core (PC) will call out to protocol details (PD), but, for defining security, such calls will be serviced by the adversary. Parties accepting an authentication exchange will output a string of associated data, the value of which may be determined by the PD calls. We illustrate the approach by re-proving security for the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol, but extended in a manner that would be typical were the mechanism embedded in a real-world standard. Source Code Review of the Sequoia Voting System Report to the Secretary of State of California, July 20, 2007 as part of the "Top-to-bottom Review" led by Matt Bishop and David Wagner Authors: Matt Blaze, Arel Cordero, Sophie Engle, Chris Karlof, Naveen Sastry, Micah Sherr, Till Stegers, and Kai-Ping Yee Download PDF file of our report Decertification/recertification decision by Secretary of State Debra Bowen Very Brief Abstract: We found significant security weaknesses throughout the Sequoia system. The nature of these weaknesses raises serious questions as to whether the Sequoia software can be relied upon to protect the integrity of elections. Every software mechanism for transmitting election results and every software mechanism for updating software lacks reliable measures to detect or prevent tampering. In certain cases, audit mechanisms may be able to detect and recover from some attacks, depending on county-specific procedures; other attacks may be more difficult to detect after-the-fact even with very rigorous audits. Computational Soundness of Formal Indistinguishability and Static Equivalence ASIAN 2006 and Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 2006/323 Gergei Bana, Payman Mohassel, and Till Stegers Download full version: http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/323.pdf Abstract: In the research of the relationship between the formal and the computational view of cryptography, a recent approach uses static equivalence from cryptographic pi calculi as a notion of formal indistinguishability. Previous work has shown that this yields the soundness of natural interpretations of some interesting equational theories, such as certain cryptographic operations and a theory of XOR. In this paper however, we argue that static equivalence is too coarse for sound interpretations of equational theories in general. We show some explicit examples how static equivalence fails to work in interesting cases. To fix this problem, we propose a notion of formal indistinguishability that is more flexible than static equivalence. We provide a general framework along with general theorems, and then discuss how this new notion works for the explicit examples where static equivalence failed to ensure soundness. We also improve the treatment by using ordered sorts in the formal view, and by allowing arbitrary probability distributions of the interpretations. Security Analysis of the eVACS Open-Source Voting System Manuscript, 2005 Ananya Das, Yuan Niu, and Till Stegers Download PDF file: eVACS-final-report.pdf Abstract: The electronic Voting and Counting System (eVACS) is an open-source software used in an electronic voting trial in the Australian Capital Territory, and has been recommended for use in future elections. In this paper, we report results from a review of the eVACS code and design, supported by static analysis tools. While no "hot exploits" have been found, several bad practices were identified.
Theses
Faugère's F5 Algorithm Revisited
A Survey of Concrete Categories Where All Reflexive
Objects Are Degenerate
Aspects of the Discrete Logarithm | Links |