Till Stegerse-mail: *my last name* at cs.ucdavis.eduPGP Key | Stats Short BioI am a PhD student in the Department of Computer Science at the University of California, Davis. From 2001 to 2005, I studied Mathematics with Computer Science at TU Darmstadt in Germany. In 2002/2003, I was fortunate to attend the graduate program in Mathematics at Tulane University in New Orleans. I joined UC Davis in Fall 2005, and I am excited to work on topics in cryptography and security. My advisor is Phil Rogaway. You can find my curriculum vitae here. |
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PapersSource Code Review of the Sequoia Voting SystemReport to the Secretary of State of California, July 20, 2007 as part of the "Top-to-bottom Review" led by Matt Bishop and David Wagner Authors: Matt Blaze, Arel Cordero, Sophie Engle, Chris Karlof, Naveen Sastry, Micah Sherr, Till Stegers, and Kai-Ping Yee Download PDF file of our report Decertification/recertification decision by Secretary of State Debra Bowen Very Brief Abstract: We found significant security weaknesses throughout the Sequoia system. The nature of these weaknesses raises serious questions as to whether the Sequoia software can be relied upon to protect the integrity of elections. Every software mechanism for transmitting election results and every software mechanism for updating software lacks reliable measures to detect or prevent tampering. In certain cases, audit mechanisms may be able to detect and recover from some attacks, depending on county-specific procedures; other attacks may be more difficult to detect after-the-fact even with very rigorous audits. Computational Soundness of Formal Indistinguishability and Static Equivalence ASIAN 2006 and Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 2006/323 Gergei Bana, Payman Mohassel, and Till Stegers Download full version: http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/323.pdf Abstract: In the research of the relationship between the formal and the computational view of cryptography, a recent approach uses static equivalence from cryptographic pi calculi as a notion of formal indistinguishability. Previous work has shown that this yields the soundness of natural interpretations of some interesting equational theories, such as certain cryptographic operations and a theory of XOR. In this paper however, we argue that static equivalence is too coarse for sound interpretations of equational theories in general. We show some explicit examples how static equivalence fails to work in interesting cases. To fix this problem, we propose a notion of formal indistinguishability that is more flexible than static equivalence. We provide a general framework along with general theorems, and then discuss how this new notion works for the explicit examples where static equivalence failed to ensure soundness. We also improve the treatment by using ordered sorts in the formal view, and by allowing arbitrary probability distributions of the interpretations. Security Analysis of the eVACS Open-Source Voting System Manuscript, 2005 Ananya Das, Yuan Niu, Till Stegers Download PDF file: eVACS-final-report.pdf Abstract: The electronic Voting and Counting System (eVACS) is an open-source software used in an electronic voting trial in the Australian Capital Territory, and has been recommended for use in future elections. In this paper, we report results from a review of the eVACS code and design, supported by static analysis tools. While no "hot exploits" have been found, several bad practices were identified.
Theses
Faugère's F5 Algorithm Revisited
A Survey of Concrete Categories Where All Reflexive
Objects Are Degenerate
Aspects of the Discrete Logarithm | Links |